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Creators/Authors contains: "Damevski, Kostadin"

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  1. Abstract The widespread adoption of conversational LLMs for software development has raised new security concerns regarding the safety of LLM-generated content. Our motivational study outlines ChatGPT’s potential in volunteering context-specific information to the developers, promoting safe coding practices. Motivated by this finding, we conduct a study to evaluate the degree of security awareness exhibited by three prominent LLMs: Claude 3, GPT-4, and Llama 3. We prompt these LLMs with Stack Overflow questions that contain vulnerable code to evaluate whether they merely provide answers to the questions or if they also warn users about the insecure code, thereby demonstrating a degree of security awareness. Further, we assess whether LLM responses provide information about the causes, exploits, and the potential fixes of the vulnerability, to help raise users’ awareness. Our findings show that all three models struggle to accurately detect and warn users about vulnerabilities, achieving a detection rate of only 12.6% to 40% across our datasets. We also observe that the LLMs tend to identify certain types of vulnerabilities related to sensitive information exposure and improper input neutralization much more frequently than other types, such as those involving external control of file names or paths. Furthermore, when LLMs do issue security warnings, they often provide more information on the causes, exploits, and fixes of vulnerabilities compared to Stack Overflow responses. Finally, we provide an in-depth discussion on the implications of our findings, and demonstrated a CLI-based prompting tool that can be used to produce more secure LLM responses. 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available July 1, 2026
  2. Free, publicly-accessible full text available January 1, 2026
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    Software engineers are crowdsourcing answers to their everyday challenges on Q&A forums (e.g., Stack Overflow) and more recently in public chat communities such as Slack, IRC, and Gitter. Many software-related chat conversations contain valuable expert knowledge that is useful for both mining to improve programming support tools and for readers who did not participate in the original chat conversations. However, most chat platforms and communities do not contain built-in quality indicators (e.g., accepted answers, vote counts). Therefore, it is difficult to identify conversations that contain useful information for mining or reading, i.e., conversations of post hoc quality. In this article, we investigate automatically detecting developer conversations of post hoc quality from public chat channels. We first describe an analysis of 400 developer conversations that indicate potential characteristics of post hoc quality, followed by a machine learning-based approach for automatically identifying conversations of post hoc quality. Our evaluation of 2,000 annotated Slack conversations in four programming communities (python, clojure, elm, and racket) indicates that our approach can achieve precision of 0.82, recall of 0.90, F-measure of 0.86, and MCC of 0.57. To our knowledge, this is the first automated technique for detecting developer conversations of post hoc quality. 
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